There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was required to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the completion of the church it was always administered, until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to that church.
At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted,
there were present about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that
the population of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants
were satisfied with the action there taken. Although it is of no importance in the case,
we are inclined to think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about 100 of
the principal men of the town were in favor of the resolution and about 20 of such
principal men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Ramirez,
continued in the possession of the church and other property and administered the same
under the directions of his superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino
Church. The rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the same after the
14th day of November as they were before, but the relations between the Roman
Catholic Church and the defendant had been entirely severed.
In January, 1904. the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant,
Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the
owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other
property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and
that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which
was retained by him, and for other relief.
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the
allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration
of the property described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and
of the inhabitants of the same who were the lawful owners of the said property. After
this answer had been presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the
municipality of Lagonox filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the
case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition been
granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged
that the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the
complaint under the authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and
that such municipality was the owner thereof.
Plaintiff answered this complaint or answer in intervention, an the case was
tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants. The defendants then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.
That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property
described in the complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the
evidence. It does not appear that the municipality, as a corporate body, ever took any
action in reference to this matter until they presented their petition for intervention in
this case. In fact, the witnesses for the defense, when they speak of the ownership of
the buildings, say that they are owned by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, the
president, said that the municipality as a corporation had nothing whatever to do with
the matter. That the resolution adopted on the 14th of November, and which has been
quoted above, was not the action of the municipality, as such, is apparent from an
inspection thereof.
The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the church by the people of
the pueblo to the defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the case of any such
delivery. Their testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on
the 14th of November, a record of which appears that in the document above quoted. It
is apparent that the action taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the
Roman Catholic Church, and nothing is said therein in reference to the material
property then in possession of the defendant, Ramirez.
There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed.
(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the
property as the servant or agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to the
possession at the time he took it, was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff,
and he took possession under the agreement to return that possession whenever it
should be demanded of him. Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when
the return of such possession is demanded by him the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff
is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. The
principle of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord’s title, which is found in section
333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is
applicable to a case of this kind. An answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he
alleged that he himself was the owner of the property at the time he received it from the
plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the owner of the property at that
time, would constitute no defense. There is no claim made by him that since the
delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the
title thereto by other means, nor does he is own behalf make any claim whatever either
to the property or to the possession thereof.
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such, to be the
owner of the property. As we have said before, the evidence shows that it never was in
the physical possession of the property. But waiving this point and assuming that the
possession of Ramirez, which he alleges in his answer is the possession of the
municipality, gives the municipality the rights of a possessor, the question still arises,
Who has the better right to the present possession of the property? The plaintiff, in
1902, had been in the lawful possession thereof for more than thirty years and during
all that time its possession had never been questioned or disturbed. That possession has
been taken away from it and it has the right now to recover the possession from the
persons who have so deprived it of such possession, unless the latter can show that they
have a better right thereto. This was the preposition which was discussed and settled in
the case of Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, No. 1748, decided June 1, 1906. That
decision holds that as against one who has been in possession for the length of the
plaintiff has been in possession, and who had been deprived of his possession, and who
can not produce any written evidence of title, the mere fact that the defendant is in
possession does not entitle the defendant to retain that possession. In order that he may
continue in possession, he must show a better right thereto.
The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality has, as such, any
right of whatever in the property in question. It has produced no evidence of ownership.
Its claim of ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following
propositions: That the property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the
Spanish Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the
Government of the United States; that by section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
that by the circular of that Government, dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and
the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If for
the purposes of the argument we should admit that the propositions are true, there
is no evidence whatever to support the last proposition, namely that the Government of
the Philippine Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the municipality
of Lagonoy. We have found no circular of the date above referred to. The one of
February 10, 1903, which is probably the one intended, contains nothing that indicates
any such transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy therefore, it is very clear that it
has neither title, ownership, nor right of possession.
(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership ever admitting
that the Spanish Government was the owner of the property and it has passed by the
treaty of Paris to the American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a
matter of law, the Spanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed, was
not the owner of this property, nor of any other property like it, situated in the
Philippine Islands.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the
Philippine Islands were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the
Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows:
Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses of the
Spaniards and natives of our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost
and expense of our royal treasury, and applied for their service and maintenance
the part of the tithes belonging to us by apostolic concession according to the
division we have made.
Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches such as the one
in question. That law is as follows:
The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall be of
durable and decent construction. Their costs shall be divided and paid in three
parts: One by our royal treasury, another by the residents and Indian
encomenderos of the place where such churches are constructed and the other
part by the Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a city, village, or
place there should be any Indians incorporated to our royal crown, we command
that for our part there be contributed the same amount as the residents and
encomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents who have no Indians
shall also contribute for this purpose in accordance with their stations and wealth,
and that which is so given shall be deducted from the share of the Indians should
pay.
Law 11 of the same title is as follows:
We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the
erection of churches shall be given to their superintendents to be expended for
those things necessary for these churches with the advice of the prelates and
officials, and by their warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and charge the
archbishops and bishops not to interfere in the collection and disbursement
thereof but to guard these structures.
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:
In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall be erected a
church where mass can be decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key,
notwithstanding the fact that it be the subject to or separate from a parish.
Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and
under his direction, but it was made unlawful to erect a church without the license of
the King. This provision is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:
Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and maintain all
cathedrals, parish churches, monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious
and pious establishments where they are necessary for the teaching, propagation,
and preaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to aid to
this effect with out royal treasury whenever possible, and to receive information of
such places where they should be founded and are necessary, and the ecclesiastical
patronage of all our Indies belonging to us:
We command that there shall not be erected, instituted, founded, or
maintained any cathedral, parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches,
or other pious or religious establishment without our express permission as is
provided in Law 1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book, notwithstanding any
permission heretofore given by our viceroy or other ministers, which in this
respect we revoke and make null, void, and of no effect.
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain, all
tithes in the Indies were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made the
King of the fund thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as
follows:
Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by the
apostolic concessions of the supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our
royal treasury of those provinces to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due
and to become due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in
which it has been the custom to pay the same, and from these tithes the churches
shall be provided with competent persons of good character to serve them and
with all ornaments and things which may be necessary for divine worship, to the
end that these churches may be well served and equipped, and we shall be
informed of God, our Lord; this order shall be observed where the contrary has
not already been directed by us in connection with the erection of churches.
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was
continued to the present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January
1856, and by the royal order of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the
construction and repair of churches, there being authority for saying that the latter order
was in force in the Philippines.
This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines, having
been erected by the Spanish Government, and under its direction, the next question to
be considered is, To whom did these churches belong?
Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and, after
discussing what can be called public property and what can be called private property,
speaks, in Law 12, of those things which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as
follows:
Law XII. HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.
No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be
the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his
property holdings. Although the priests may have such things in their possession,
yet they are not the owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians or
servants, or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or without
them. Hence they were allowed to take from the revenues of the church and lands
what was reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging to God,
was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of the poor,
the support of orphans, the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming
evil women because of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives and the
repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, books, and others
things which they might be in need of, and other similar charitable purposes.
And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in to which this law
has divided these things, it defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida consecrated
things. That law is as follows:
Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by the bishops,
such as churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books,
and all other things which are intended for the service of the church, and the title
to these things can not be alienated except in certain specific cases as we have
already shown in the first partida of this book by the laws dealing with this
subject. We say further that even where a consecrated church is razed, the ground
upon which it formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. But if any
consecrated church should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it shall
there and then cease to be sacred as long as the enemy has it under control,
although once recovered by the Christians, it will again become sacred, reverting
to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall have all the right and
privileges formerly belonging to it.
That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still exist is indicated
by Sanchez Roman, whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement:
First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. A. Spiritual. From
early times distinction has been made by authors and by law between things
governed by divine law, called divine, and those governed by human law, called
human, and although the former can not be the subject of civil juridical relations,
their nature and species should be ascertained either to identify them and exclude
them from such relations or because they furnish a complete explanation of the
foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the laws of the partida deal with
them.
Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by
God for his service and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or
canonical laws. This makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual things, which are
those which have a direct influence on the religious redemption of man such as the
sacrament, prayers, fasts, indulgences, etc., and corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are
those means more or less direct for the proper religious salvation of man.
7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things
(sacred, religious, holy, and temporal belonging to the church). Corporeal or
ecclesiastical things are so divided.
(a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and worship in
general, such as temples, altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be alienated
except for some pious purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws,
according to which their control pertains to the ecclesiastical authorities, and in so
far as their use is concerned, to the believers and the clergy (2 Derecho Civil
Español, Sanchez Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil
Code, p. 636; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionarie de La Administracion Española, p. 486.)
The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and
what belonged to private persons. In the first group churches are not named. The
present Civil Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private
ownership. Article 339, which defines public property, is as follows:
Property of public ownership is
- That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of similar character.
- That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use
and which is destined to some public service, or to the development of the
national wealth such as walls fortresses and other works for the defense of the
territory, and mines, until their concession has been granted
The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos, and in defining
what property is of public use, article 344 declares as follows:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial
and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the
promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or
provinces.
All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be
governed by the provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribe in special laws.
It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of
churches. When the Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which
were for the common use of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the
State, while it mentioned a great many other things, it did not mention churches.
It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the
Mortgage Law indicates that churches belong to the State and are public property. That
article is as follows:
There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law:
First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the
State, and which is for the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers
and their borders, wagon roads, and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of
railroads; streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of towns, provided
they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants; walls of cities and parks,
ports, and roadsteads, and any other analogous property during the time they are
in common and general use, always reserving the servitudes established by law on
the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.
Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.
A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the
State and to the eminent domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had
belonged to the State, they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of
being placed in a paragraph by themselves.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to
the United States, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of
the commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of
private property in the sense that any private person could the owner thereof. They
constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was that was devoted
to the worship of God.
But, being material things was necessary that some one should have the care and
custody of them and the administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom,
under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and administration? For the
purposes of the Spanish law there was only one religion. That was the religion
professed by the Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion and
for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the Philippines
were erected. The possession of the churches, their care and custody, and the
maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that
body. It was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which could under any
circumstances have possession of, or any control over, any church dedicated to the
worship of God. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of control were
necessarily exclusive. It not necessary or important to give any name to this right of
possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings
of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical
person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the
exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the
churches in the Philippines, did not give him any right to interfere with the material
possession of these buildings.
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del
Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There is nothing in any one of the fify-one laws which
compose this title which in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of
the churches in the Indies because he had constructed them. These laws relate to the
right of presentation to ecclesiastical charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the
title commences as follows:
Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops,
bishops, dignitaries, prevents, curates, and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and
ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us. no other person can obtain or
possess the same without our presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of
this title.
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private
persons, but there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates
that the private patron is the owner of the church.
When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not
intended to say that the Government and had no power over it. It may be that by virtue
0f that power of emminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it
might have appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of
individuals. But nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman
Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it
had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building
consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights
aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That
treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as tbllows:
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the
property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of
all kinds or provinces municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to
acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of
private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the
Government of the United States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever
attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had
in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference
that has resulted has been caused by private individuals acting without any authority
from the Government.
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made
between the church and the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the
church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the
Laws of the Indies would apply. That law is as follows:
We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such
houses as maybe deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barriosm may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of the place where that maybe built for the benefit of the priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other purpose.
The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is
always mentioned in connection with the church and convent and no point is made by
possession of the church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover possession
of the cemetery. So, without discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable
to churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose of this
case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he has to the church.
(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no
legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe,
and which existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols
were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by Montero
Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October 1871, speaking of the Roman Cathlic Church,
he says:
Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence
up to the time of was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it
among the juridicial entities protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until
then by the mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence upon
pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third century, and more
particularly since the year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered upon
the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of
the Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211, See also
the royal order of the 4th of Decemher, 1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189)
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let
judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be
remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Arellano C.J., Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.